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This  article  analyses  the  export offensive made by Mexico,
Central America and some Caribbean countries since the
mid-1980s. Notwithstanding the differences between them, in
all the countries in question this offensive has been aimed
mainly  at the United States market, has been stimulated by
import tariff privileges and other incentives, and has been based
on poorly-paid assembly operations: i.e., it involves the in-bond
assembly or “maquila” industries. This study seeks to determine
whether these industries contribute to local technological devel-
opment. The answer, based on a questionnaire sent to 75
maquila firms in six countries, must be “yes”. The maquila
industry uses production techniques close to the best interna-
tional practices –something matched only in a very few domes-
tic manufacturing firms– and it helps to train human resources
and introduce modern concepts of organization and manage-
ment. Moreover,  it makes intensive use of unskilled labour.
Consequently, in order to progress towards sustainable develop-
ment with social equity it would appear to be necessary to turn
the maquila industry into an increasingly competitive activity
by increasing its productivity and the added value of its prod-
ucts. The evolution of maquila industries in the direction of
activities using a more highly skilled labour force is perfectly
possible, as the case of Mexico shows, and it will become un-
avoidable when pressures on the labour market cause real
wages to rise, as in Costa Rica. This will not happen automat-
ically, however, and even less so in countries that lack institu-
tions to support that process.







The export structure and performance of Mexico,
Central America and some Caribbean countries has
changed  greatly over  the past  two  decades. These
countries used to depend heavily on exports of pri-
mary products, but began to face declining market
shares in that activity. Today, they mainly export
manufactured products and are rapidly gaining mar-
ket shares. Apparently, this is exactly what conven-
tional wisdom would suggest such countries should
do in order to achieve economic development: in-
crease their participation in international trade and
change the product composition of their exports. In-
deed, ECLAC has formulated policy statements in this
sense (ECLAC, 1990).
But is this particular kind of export drive a good
engine for development? ECLAC distinguishes various
different ways for a country to expand exports
(ECLAC, 1990), and some may be more conducive to
development than others. International competitiveness
can be achieved by constantly lowering real wages, at
the expense of the environment, or via government sub-
sidies to firms, at the cost of increasing fiscal deficits.
Exports based on one of those factors may not lead to
sustainable development. The late Fernando Fajnzyl-
ber, who coordinated the ECLAC study in question,
labeled these forms as “spurious” competitiveness.
On the other hand, international competitiveness can
be based on  increasing productivity, which requires
continuous technical progress. The same author consid-
ered technical change to be the only “authentic” source
of competitiveness, and the most conducive to sustain-
able development. The 1990 ECLAC propositions
therefore aimed at increasing competitiveness
through technical change.
Let us consider the export drive carried out since
the mid-1980s by the countries mentioned above.
Naturally, there are conspicuous differences between
Mexico on the one hand, and the Central American
and Caribbean countries on the other. This paper will
discuss those differences at some length. Nevertheless,
it is true for all these countries that the export drive has
been i) chiefly oriented towards the United States mar-
ket; ii) stimulated by import tariff privileges and local
tax exemptions and other incentives, and iii) it has been
based on low-wage assembly-type operations: what
have come to be known as “maquila industries”, the
definition of which is not very clear-cut. At all events,
the last two points seem to fit closely the description of
“spurious competitiveness”.
To dismiss the export success of these countries
as  being based  on “spurious competitiveness” and
“less conducive to development” would be too rash a
conclusion, however. Does the maquila industry con-
tribute at all to technological progress? Is there tech-
nical change in the maquila industry? If it is not, as
yet, a sign of “authentic” competitiveness, could it
perhaps lead to it? These are the questions this paper
seeks to answer.
A questionnaire was applied to some 75
maquiladora firms in six countries,1 on the basis of
which we are able to describe in some detail the tech-
nology transfer and learning processes in maquila firms.
Differences between the Mexican experience and that in
the other five countries became apparent. Also, differ-
ences between firms with capital of different national
origin were observed. In all, we conclude that there is
(albeit quite limited) some form of technology transfer
and an upgrading of local productive capacities through
maquila. This aspect has been rather neglected in the
development strategies of those countries,  in which
maquila is seen mainly as an employment generating
device and to some extent also as a foreign exchange
earner. It has hardly been considered as a source for the
upgrading of productive and technological skills. Our
proposition is that maquila should also be considered
as a strategy for the development of productive capaci-
ties, which would imply a different policy approach to
this activity.
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 This paper is based on ECLAC (1998) and is a revision of a
paper presented at the 21st Conference of the Latin American
Studies Association, Chicago, 1998.
1 Mexico, four Central American countries (Costa Rica, Guate-
mala, El Salvador and Honduras) and one Caribbean country (the
Dominican Republic).
This paper starts (section II) with the presentation
of foreign trade data that reveal the change in the inter-
national insertion of those countries in which the
maquila industry has risen fast over the past decade or
so. Next (section III), the term “maquila industry” is
defined and the growth of this industry is described.
The third and most important part of this paper
(section IV) presents the results of the questionnaire
survey. Finally, section V contains some concluding
remarks and reflections on policy approaches.
II
Export performance and composition
In this chapter we will use the same type of informa-
tion and methodology as proposed by Fajnzylber
(1991).2 This methodology illustrates well the drastic
change in the international insertion of the economies
studied. First, let us consider the market share of the
group of selected countries in the total imports of the
industrialized countries. Table 1 shows that the se-
lected  countries  as a group  increased their  market
share between 1989 and 1995 at a pace comparable to
successful South-East Asian countries.
Next, we will follow the approach of Fajnzylber
(1991) to analyse this export performance in two di-
mensions: the quality of product composition, and
the competitiveness (defined as ability to gain market
share) for each product group. Using a rather simple
form of shift and share analysis, Fajnzylber presented
a matrix inspired by the typology introduced by the
Boston Consulting Group. With it, he devised a sim-
ple set of indicators which he used as proxies for
competitiveness and the quality of the composition of
exports.
Algebraically, the indicators are defined as fol-
lows. The change in the market share of country i in
OECD imports M of product group j between base
year b and final year f is represented by:
(Mij (f) / Mj (f)) - (Mij (b) / Mj (b)) (1)
If the formula gives a positive result, country i is
a “winner” in the OECD market for product group j. If
negative, then country i lost market share.
The change in product share for each product j in
total OECD imports may be expressed as:
(Mj (f) / M (f)) - (Mj (b) / M (b)) (2)
If the second formula gives a positive value, this
means that imports of product group j grew faster than
total imports, so that it may be called a product group
with “dynamic demand growth”, or simply a “dynamic
product”. In contrast, a negative value indicates a
“stagnant product”. It may be noted that Fajnzylber
implicitly assumed a positive correlation between
“dynamic products” and “technology-intensive” or “new”
products. The exercise can be shown in a two-by-two
matrix, with formula 1 on the vertical axis and
formula 2 on the horizontal axis (figure 1.)
The sum total of all products in all four catego-
ries for country i equals the total exports of that coun-
try to the OECD market (Mi). Now two indicators may
be calculated.
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2 It is necessary to use information on industrialized countries’
imports instead of export data, because maquila exports are not
always well registered in the latter sources.
TABLE 1
Selected regions and countries:
Shares in industrialized countries’ imports
(Percentages)
Mexico, Central
Year Latin America Asian America and
Tigers a the Dominican
Republic
1977 5.21 6.52 1.47
1984 6.16 8.34 2.32
1989 4.61 9.68 1.74
1995 4.97 12.66 2.48
Source: ECLAC, CANPLUS data base.
a South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore.
The ratio (ΣRS+ΣDS) / Mi may be considered an
indicator of competitiveness, given that it reflects the
percentage of total export value of products in which
country i gains market share. Fajnzylber called this
“efficiency”, and it is a proxy for revealed “competi-
tiveness”.
The ratio (ΣRS+ΣLO) / Mi may be considered an
indicator of the quality of the product composition of
exports, given that it reflects the percentage of total
export value consisting of dynamic products.
Fajnzylber called this “positioning”. Both the effi-
ciency and the positioning indicators may vary in the-
ory between 0 and 100. The efficiency indicator is 0
when the country has lost market shares in all prod-
ucts with which it participated in OECD imports; and
is 100 if it gained market shares in every exported
product. The positioning indicator will be 0 if  all
product markets in which a country participated grew
less than the growth of total OECD imports, and it is
100 if all product markets grew above average.
Table 2 presents both the 1979-1988 period
(Fajnzylber 1991) and the update to 1995 made for
this article. It shows that Mexico and the Dominican
Republic3 already scored high on both indicators in
1988, and in the subsequent period, up to 1995, these
countries improved slightly on their already good
performance. Costa Rica was also already a “winner”
country in 1988, more because of its competitiveness
(94% of total exports was in products in which Costa
Rica gained market shares) than because of good po-
sitioning.4 Indeed, “stagnant” products were the
mainstay of Costa Rican exports in the second period
too. In all three countries, the maquila industry started
to grow early in the 1980s, which explains a good deal
of the good performance indicators in 1988.
A dramatic shift can be observed in the situation
of the other three Central American countries. From
being among the world’s worst export performers in
the 1980s, all three countries advanced to a place
among the best performers. Not only did they dis-
place competitors from the product markets in which
they participate, but their export product groups are
in dynamic demand (United States imports of these
products grow faster than average).
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FIGURE 1
The competitiveness matrix
Declining Stars (DS) Rising Stars (RS)
Stagnant products in which country i Dynamic products in which country i
gains market share gains market share
Retreats (R) Lost Opportunities (LO)
Stagnant products in which country i Dynamic products in which country i
loses market share loses market share
TABLE 2
Efficiency and positioning of selected
countries, 1979-1988 and 1989-1995
(Percentages)
Country Years Efficiency Positioning
Mexico 1979-1988 83 64
1989-1995 84 65
Guatemala 1979-1988 39 24
1989-1995 93 71
El Salvador 1979-1988 8 26
1989-1995 92 94
Honduras 1979-1988 41 24
1989-1995 81 80
Costa Rica 1979-1988 94 38
1989-1995 94 41
Dominican 1979-1988 74 60
Republic 1989-1995 86 80
Source: ECLAC, CANPLUS data base.
3 With regard to the Dominican Republic, see for example Mor-
timore, Duthoo y Guerrero (1995)
4 Mortimore and Zamora (1998) offer detailed information on
Costa Rican apparel exports.
Will this impressive performance, both in
terms of increased market shares and of improved
product composition of exports, lead to sustainable
development? It may, in the view of ECLAC, if it is
based on technical change and productivity in-
creases. This paper analyses in particular the contri-
bution to technical change made by maquila exports.
In order to show the particular importance of such
exports, the following tables present data on maquila
exports as a percentage of total exports for Mexico
(table 3) and Central America and the Dominican
Republic (tables 4 and 5). The Mexican statistics dif-
ferentiate maquila exports from other exports, and the
percentage increased from 11-15% at the beginning
of the 1980s to around 40% in the 1990s. It is clear
that such exports have grown significantly faster than
other exports.
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TABLE 3
Mexico: Maquila exports as a percentage
of total exports a, 1980-1997
Year Percentage Year Percentage
1980 14.0 1989 35.1
1981 13.8 1990 34.1
1982 11.7 1991 37.1
1983 14.0 1992 40.4
1984 16.9 1993 42.1
1985 19.0 1994 43.1
1986 25.9 1995 39.1
1987 25.7 1996 38.5
1988 33.1 1997 40.9
Source: Banco de México, http://www.banxico.org.mx
a Both maquila exports and total exports are FOB values, and repre-
sent the gross production value. Maquila exports are those exports
registered under the “Maquila Programme”.
TABLE 4
Central America and Dominican Republic: Maquila exports as
a percentage of total exports to the United States a, 1990-1997
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Costa Rica 39.9 36.8 40.2 46.3 41.5 44.0 43.1 ...
El Salvador 30.6 58.8 52.5 57.5 70.8 79.3 82.3 81.0
Guatemala 43.3 50.6 57.9 58.0 62.6 60.8 55.6 57.8
Honduras 43.7 43.1 51.8 59.6 71.2 81.2 72.7 70.0
Nicaragua ... 10.6 17.9 12.7 13.6 13.2 17.1 31.6
Dominican Republic ... ... 40.4 44.5 45.7 ... ... ...
Source: U. S. Department of Commerce and ECLAC, BADECEL data base.
a United States imports are valued FAS (Free Alongside Ship), and therefore do not include port services, while the countries’ exports
correspond to their FOB value. Both values represent the gross production value.
TABLE 5
Central America and Dominican Republic: Maquila
exports as a percentage of total exports, 1990-1997
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Costa Rica 21.6 20.7 23.6 26.9 23.5 23.1 23.4 ...
El Salvador 12.6 32.9 26.7 28.1 34.7 39.6 46.3 44.5
Guatemala 22.8 27.5 32.5 34.1 34.8 32.4 31.4 32.9
Honduras 28.0 28.4 35.5 45.1 55.8 64.1 60.7 61.1
Nicaragua ... 2.3 4.9 5.6 6.1 5.8 8.3 17.2
Dominican Republic ... ... 36.2 40.4 41.6 ... ... ...
Source: U. S. Department of Commerce and ECLAC, BADECEL data base.
National data for Central America and the Do-
minican Republic do not incorporate maquila ex-
ports. United States import data do, but information
is available only from 1990 onward (due to the intro-
duction of the Harmonized System). By deducting
from the United States imports originating in Central
America and the Dominican Republic the exports to
the United States registered in the national data5, an
approximation of the maquila exports of those coun-
tries can be obtained. Table 4 shows that maquila
exports from El Salvador and Honduras account for
70-80% of total exports to the United States, a per-
centage that has increased sharply in the 1990s, while
maquila exports from Costa Rica, Guatemala and the
Dominican Republic account for around 50%. As a
percentage of  total  exports to the world (table 5),
maquila exports amount to as much as 61% in the
case of Honduras, and close to 50% in El Salvador
and the Dominican Republic.6
Finally, table 6 shows the market shares of Mexico,
the Central American countries and the Dominican Re-
public in the North American market (the United States
and Canada), Europe and Japan. The rise in maquila
exports accounts for the notable increase in market
shares in the North American market in the 1990s,
whereas market shares in Europe and Japan remained
virtually unchanged. Their striking export performance
was therefore mainly based  on  their  exports  to  the
United States, and in particular on the exports from
maquila industries to that market.
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TABLE 6
Mexico, Central American countries and the Dominican Republic:
Shares in selected import markets
(Percentages)
1979 1984 1989 1998
Market shares in North American imports a
Mexico 3.56 4.86 4.74 6.78
Costa Rica 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.23
El Salvador 0.16 0.11 0.05 0.09
Guatemala 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.18
Honduras 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.16
Dominican Republic 0.27 0.25 0.28 0.38
Central America + Dominican Republic 0.92 0.74 0.72 1.03
Market shares in European imports
Mexico 0.14 0.60 0.24 0.19
Costa Rica 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.05
El Salvador 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02
Guatemala 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.02
Honduras 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
Dominican Republic 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Central America + Dominican Republic 0.27 0.15 0.11 0.13
Market shares in Japanese imports
Mexico 0.43 1.53 0.83 0.46
Costa Rica 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
El Salvador 0.09 0.03 0.01 -
Guatemala 0.13 0.04 0.02 0.03
Honduras 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
Dominican Republic 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Central America + Dominican Republic 0.28 0.13 0.10 0.09
Source: ECLAC, CANPLUS data base.
a The United States and Canada.
5 According to ECLAC’s BADECEL data base.
6 It is generally accepted that maquila exports embody less local
raw materials than “non-maquila” exports. Consequently, the
contribution of the value added in maquila exports to total export
added value would be less than the percentages shown in tables




As demonstrated above, the increase in market shares
achieved by the selected countries is largely the result
of the “maquila industry”. But what precisely is
maquila? The dictionary says that  it  is a word of
Arabic origin, meaning the portion of grain or oil a
miller receives as payment for the milling. In broader
economic terms, it would be an activity in which the
owner of  the raw material hires  the owner of  the
capital good and his labour force to perform a pro-
duction process, the payment being a fixed percent-
age of the processed product.
In present-day Mexico, the term “maquila” is as-
sociated with a type of economic activity that was
first made possible by the Programa de Industriali-
zación Fronteriza (Border Industrialization Pro-
gramme). This programme was adopted in 1965 to
provide employment for approximately 200 000
Mexican labourers who had to return from the United
States because of the ending of the Braceros Pro-
gram, which had provided them with temporary em-
ployment in the United States in times of labour
shortage, especially during the Second World War
and the Korean War.
The Border Industrialization Programme allowed
tariff-free imports of capital goods and inputs, for
export of the finished product. It perhaps resembles
the old notion of maquila in that Mexico offers its
territory and labour force to a foreign entrepreneur
who provides inputs and takes back the processed
product. It was essentially a programme to attract
foreign direct investment of United States origin
for export-oriented assembly operations along the
Northern Border. As such, it was an important depar-
ture from prevailing import-substitution policies. In
1971 the legislation was modified to allow maquila
industries to settle in coastal areas and cities in the
interior of the Republic.
The exemptions from duty offered by Mexico in
respect of foreign direct investment establishing as-
sembly operations for re-export were complemented by
the tariff treatment the assembled products received in
the United States. Since 1930 the United States Tariff
Schedule had included item No. 806.30, under which
certain metal products manufactured with raw mate-
rial of United States origin could be re-imported into
the United States, paying the applicable tariff only on
the value added abroad. This provision was estab-
lished to facilitate operations between firms in the
United States and Canada. Later item 807.00 was
added, applicable  to  goods  processed  abroad with
materials of United States origin. This provision fa-
cilitated the operations abroad of United States tran-
snational firms.
Central America  and the Dominican Republic
followed a different approach from that adopted by
Mexico to attract foreign direct investment for the
establishment of assembly operations for export, but
the aim was likewise to take advantage of the item
807.00 import tariff provision. Here, export process-
ing free zones were created following the example of
several South-East Asian countries. In these Free
Zones, which were State-owned industrial parks,
firms were also allowed to import free of duty raw
materials, inputs and capital goods for the re-export
of the finished product. Some parks also provided
buildings and basic services for the assembly opera-
tions. With varying success, all countries except
Costa Rica established these Free Zones in the early
1970s. Costa Rica used a special tariff regime to
allow the establishment of assembly activities for
export.
The crisis of the early  1980s  led to profound
changes both in the economic environment sur-
rounding the maquila industry and in the legal frame-
work in which it operated. From being an exception
in an otherwise inward-oriented policy  framework,
the export-oriented assembly industry became a
spearhead in the change towards an export-led de-
velopment model. The high political priority at-
tached   to   exports first translated into changes in
the legal framework. In 1984 Costa Rica enhanced
the fiscal incentives for exports to destinations out-
side the Central American region; improved the law
regulating temporary entrance of goods for re-export,
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and allowed private capital to participate in the
ownership and administration of Free Zones. Guate-
mala and Honduras also introduced legislation in
the same year regarding temporary entrance and
export-processing free zones. In the Dominican Re-
public, the liberalization of the exchange-rate regime
proved fundamental for  the attraction  of assembly
operations. In many countries this legislation was
subsequently  revised and enhanced, and the legal
framework was fully operational by the beginning of
the 1990s. Box 1 resumes the changes in the legal
framework.
Another important development in the first half
of the 1980s was the creation of private sector institu-
tions to attract foreign direct investment. Cases in point
are the Coalición Costarricense de Iniciativas de De-sar-
rollo (CINDE, Costa Rica), the Gremial de Expor-
tadores de Productos No Tradicionales (GEXPRONT,
Guatemala), the Fundación para las Inversiones y el
Desarrollo Económico (FIDE, Honduras), the Fundación
Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social
(FUSADES) and the Consejo para la Promoción de la
Inversión (Dominican Republic). In many cases, these
institutions received considerable support from the
United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), sometimes channeled through its Regional Of-
fice for Central America and Panama.
The local fiscal benefits for export-oriented as-
sembly operations and the establishment of support-
ing institutions came to complement the important
privileges of access to the United States market. The
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA)
of 1983 (renewed in 1990) granted to certain coun-
tries a unilateral concession of   duty-free access to
the United States market for a substantial number
of products. Apparel was initially excluded, because
its access to the United States market is governed by
bilateral quota-restrictions under the Multifibre
Agreement. Starting in 1986, however, the United
States negotiated Special Access Programmes with
CBERA countries to facilitate apparel imports. Most
importantly, Guaranteed Access Levels were
granted to countries in Central America and the
Caribbean that gave those countries freer access to
the United States market for apparel products made
with United States fabric. Mexico, for its part, ne-
gotiated with the United States in 1988 a Special
Regime for apparel exports, providing for treat-
ment comparable with that given to the CBERA
countries.
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Box 1
CENTRAL AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING MAQUILA INDUSTRIES
Initial situation
Most laws only considered special export promotion programmes.
Only public ownership and administration of free zones was allowed.
Installation of free zones restricted to certain locations.
Only production for export allowed.
FDI restricted to certain activities.
Maquila benefits restricted to certain activities.
Present situation
Three different regimes are now in place: i) Export processing free zone laws; ii) Temporary
entrance laws and iii) Drawback systems.
Ownership and administration of free zones are now open to private capital.
Tendency to allow free zones throughout the national territory; in some countries individual plants
can receive free zone status.
Tendency to allow local sales, after paying import duties.
Liberalization and sectoral diversification of FDI.
Maquila benefits open to all export-oriented activities.
Source: Prepared by the authors, and ILO (1996).
In the case of Mexico, the most important legal
changes concerned the authorization to maquila in-
dustries to sell up to 20% (1983) and 50% (1989) of
their production on the local market. More recently,
the North America Free Trade Agreement has gradu-
ally raised this percentage, and local sales will be
allowed in full by 2001.
The existence of NAFTA has of course made the
benefits of the Mexican maquila programme less sig-
nificant for exports to the United States market, be-
cause most tariffs immediately dropped to zero and
others were gradually reduced. This does not mean
that assembly operations have become less attractive.
In the apparel industry in particular, NAFTA meant
quota-free access and significantly lower import
tariffs for exported products of Mexican origin. Fur-
thermore, transport and telecommunication services
and immigration facilities for  businesspeople  were
improved. Maquila industries may, however, take
other  options  into account  instead  of  the Maquila
Programme. The PITEX programme is another export-
promotion scheme that is increasingly used for as-
sembly operations for export (SECOFI, 1996). It was
created for domestic export-oriented firms and also
allows duty-free imports of raw materials and capital
goods. Unlike the Maquila Programme, it offers no
exemption from asset tax, but it does include a draw-
back mechanism, under which firms can secure the
return of import duties paid on inputs for exported
goods.
Fiscal benefits in Caribbean Basin countries, in-
cluding Mexico7, the establishment of supporting
institutions for the attraction of foreign direct invest-
ment, privileged access to the United States market and
the competitive pressure on United States firms have
provided the setting for explosive growth of export-
oriented assembly operations.
It has been noted, in the literature on Mexico,
that the character of maquila operations has changed
over time.8 The changes refer to organizational sys-
tems and human resource management, the impor-
tance of quality, and technological changes. The
so-called first-generation maquila plants were plants
based  on the intensification of manual  operations,
more concerned with volume than with quality. Their
presence predominated until the early 1980s. In con-
trast, second-generation plants needed the ability to
respond quickly to changes in demand for products
with  short life-cycles and higher quality standards
(Carrillo, Mortimore and Estrada (1998)). New tech-
nologies were introduced as well as new forms of
organization of the production process and changes
in human resource management. Production lines
were automated,  workers  had to  perform multiple
functions, and the proportion of engineers and techni-
cians increased. This is the type of maquila plants
that  predominate at present. A third generation of
maquila plants has also been observed, in which
knowledge-intensive activities of product development
and design are performed by Mexican engineers with
relatively lower salaries. Until now, these cases are very
exceptional.
At this point, it seems clear that there is no interna-
tionally valid clear-cut definition of maquila industries,
and therefore there is no uniform data source on the
growth and characteristics of the industry. Mexico uses
its own definition, grants maquila status to certain
plants and operations and collects statistical information
accordingly. In the countries of Central America and the
Caribbean, information exists on firms in Export Proc-
essing Free Zones and firms qualified to receive export
promotion benefits and drawback rights, while from the
United States standpoint, the information on United
States imports may shed light on the development of the
industry.
Maquila  exports  from Mexico  have grown by
close to 20% per year between 1983 and 1997.9
Growth rates were particularly strong in 1987 (26%)
and 1988 (43%). Employment in maquila industries
grew in the same period at an annual rate of 13%. In
1997, 2 867 plants employed directly almost 940 000
workers (figure 2). The increase in the number of
plants and jobs has recently been particularly marked
outside the border zone.
Between 1988 and 1997, the percentage of total
employment in maquila operations represented by the
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7 See  Mortimore  and Peres  (1998) for  some  interesting com-
ments on policy competition.
8 See Carrillo and Hualde (1997), Mertens and Palomares
(1988), Wilson (1990), and Brown and Domínguez (1989).
9 Calderón, Mortimore and Peres (1995) analyse the growth of
Mexican exports.
assembly of electrical and electronic products and
components went down from 40% to 34%. Compo-
nents for automotive vehicles have continued to ac-
count for 20% of such employment, while apparel
products have increased their share from 9% in 1988
to 20% in 1997.
Local value added of maquila exports went down
from 37% of Gross Production Value in 1974 to only
20% in 1997. Local procurement of direct inputs con-
tinues to be negligible. Wages, which are the main
component of local value added, reduced their share
in GPV from 23% in 1974 to 10% in 1996 (figure 3).
This reveals the trend towards more capital-intensive
sectors and production techniques, as well as the fall
in real wages (Banco de México, various years;
INEGI, various years).
It has not been possible to construct time series
on exports and employment for the Central American
countries. In 1996, some 800 plants provided close to
250 000 direct jobs, according to Gitli (1997). In con-
trast to Mexico, the vast majority of maquila plants in
Central America are devoted to apparel products.
Some electrical and electronic maquila firms exist,
especially in Costa Rica. This sector received a con-
siderable boost from the establishment of a micro-
processor assembly plant early in 1998.
Table 7 shows the origin of capital; it is interest-
ing to observe the presence of Korean-owned plants,
especially in Guatemala, and other Asian (Taiwan)
plants in Nicaragua. The presence of Asian capital is
mainly explained by the quota restrictions on apparel
exports to the United States from the Asian countries
themselves. There is also a significant presence of
local capital in maquila industries, especially in El
Salvador, where the law permits the granting of free-
zone status to individual plants (Predios Fiscales). In
Costa Rica, which is the country where maquila
plants were first  established, the predominance of
US-owned firms is evident.
In the Dominican Republic, maquila exports and
employment grew fast from 1985 onward. By 1996,
434 plants in 36 free zones exported a total value of
US$ 2.8 billion and employed directly 165 000 work-
ers. Almost two-thirds of total maquila exports con-
sist of apparel products.
In short, in the selected countries close to 4 000
plants classified as “maquila industries” provided in
1996 close to 1.5 million direct jobs.
Another way of gaining an approximate picture
of the evolution of maquila industries in the countries
considered is to take a look at United States imports
for the main product group involved: apparel prod-
ucts (table 9). It should be noted that these data do
not necessarily coincide with what are considered to
be maquila industries in the countries of origin.
Whereas in 1990 only 9% of all United States
apparel imports originated in the selected countries,
eight years later this figure had increased to well
over 26%. In current dollars, apparel exports from
these countries to the United States expanded from
US$ 2.1 billion to US$ 12.1 billion. Another reveal-
ing feature of table 9 concerns the tariff applied. The
THE IN-BOND ASSEMBLY INDUSTRY AND TECHNICAL CHANGE   RUDOLF M. BUITELAAR, RAMÓN PADILLA AND RUTH URRUTIA
C E P A L R E V I E W 6 7 • A P R I L 1 9 9 9146
FIGURE 2
Mexico: Employment in the maquila industry
FIGURE 3
Mexico: Shares of added value and wages
in the gross value of production
implicit tariff is calculated as total duties levied di-
vided by total value of imports. In 1990 it showed a
rather uniform picture, with tariffs between 17% and
20%. NAFTA meant the virtual elimination of tariffs
for Mexican apparel exports, while the special access
provisions for Central America and the Dominican
Republic brought the implicit tariffs down to a range
of 5%-10%. Apparel exports from countries without
preferential access to the market continue to pay a
substantially higher implicit tariff.
In the Mexican case, maquila exports of car parts
and electrical and electronic equipment are substan-
tial. Cars and parts thereof come under tariff heading
87, where Mexico increased its market share from
5% in 1990 to 13.4% in 1997. Implicit tariffs fell
from 2.8% to 0.6%. Electrical and electronic equip-
ment and parts thereof come under heading 84, where
Mexico’s market share increased from 3.6% in 1990
to 7% in 1997, with implicit tariffs falling from 1.9%
to 0.3%.
All this evidence clearly shows the impressive
performance of the maquila industry after the changes
in the legal framework, supporting institutions and
market access conditions that occurred in the 1980s
and 1990s. The next section discusses the industry’s
impact on technical change in the selected countries.
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TABLE 7
Central America: Origin of capital, number
of plants and employment
Origin of capital
Country Plants Employment
Local United States Korea Other Asia Other countries
Costa Rica 189 39 (21%) 113 (60%) 4 (2%) 3 (2%) 30 (16%) 47 972
El Salvador 190 123 (65%) 20 (11%) 16 (8%) 12 (6%) 19 (10%) 42 000
Guatemala 220 95 (43%) 20 (9%) 96 (44%) 4 (2%) 5 (2%) 61 800
Honduras 174 56 (32%) 62 (36%) 37 (21%) 17 (10%) 2 (2%) 78 583
Nicaragua 19 3 (16%) 6 (32%) 3 (16%) 6 (32%) 1 (5%) 13 000
Total region 792 316 (40%) 217 (28%) 156 (20%) 42 (5%) 57 (7%) 245 355
Source: Gitli (1997).
TABLE 8
Dominican Republic: Export Processing Zones, 1990-1996
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Exports (millions of dollars) 1 123.5 1 415.8 1 839.3 2 165.1 2 453.9 2 700.1 2 851.9
Value added (millions of dollars) 351.7 448.1 575.7 677.7 768.1 845.1 892.6
Number of EPZs 25 27 30 31 32 33 36
Number of plants 331 357 420 462 476 469 434
Employment 130 045 135 491 141 056 164 296 176 311 165 571 164 639
Source: National Council of Free Zones.
IV
Maquila and technical change:
results from a questionnaire study
Does the strong and growing maquila industry in
the selected countries generate more than low-
wage employment and a little foreign-exchange
income? What,  if anything, does it contribute to
local productive and technological capabilities?
To explore these questions, some 75 managers of
maquila plants were asked to answer a question-
naire focused mainly on learning processes within
the plant and the relations between the plant and
local firms and institutions.
The questionnaire  was divided  into three sec-
tions. The first explored in general terms the strategy
of the maquila plant. The second explored the situ-
ation within the plant regarding human capital forma-
tion and research and development activities. The last
section investigated the links between the plant and
its surrounding environment in terms of relations
with other firms, with governments and with local
institutions of education and training and technologi-
cal development.
THE IN-BOND ASSEMBLY INDUSTRY AND TECHNICAL CHANGE   RUDOLF M. BUITELAAR, RAMÓN PADILLA AND RUTH URRUTIA




A. Number of plants, 1970-1996
B. Exports, in millions of dollars, 1983-1996
C. Direct employment, 1970-1996
(number of persons employed)
TABLE 9
United States: Imports of apparel products
(Tariff chapters 61 and 62 totalized)
Market share Implicit tariff
Country of origin
1990 1997 1990 1997
Mexico 1.79 11.75 17.12 0.70
Guatemala 0.83 2.16 19.41 9.85
El Salvador 0.24 2.36 17.88 6.54
Honduras 0.49 3.78 19.54 5.72
Costa Rica 1.64 1.89 19.78 5.12
Dominican Republic 2.98 4.90 19.94 5.90
Source: United States Department of Commerce, US Imports of
Merchandise (published on CD-ROM), processed using the MAGIC
software programme developed by ECLAC.
1. Strategies of the maquila plant
First, the questionnaire asked about the motives be-
hind the existence of the plant. For a maquila plant
belonging to a United States-owned corporation, the
main motive is the lowering of costs by using cheap
labour in the selected countries. For a non-US foreign
firm, preferential access to the United States market
is usually another main motive, especially in product
markets –such as those for apparel– where quotas per
country of origin play an important role. For both
types of firms, the United States market is virtually
the only destination of production. In order for a na-
tional entrepreneur to engage in assembly operations
ordered by a foreign firm, some other motives may be
involved:  for  example, the  rate  of return  should be
higher or less risky than in the case of an investment in
production capacity for the domestic market. In this re-
gard, expectations about local demand, the evolution of
exchange rates, and different fiscal treatment play an
important role. Many local firms take on assembly con-
tracts for export in order to qualify for the fiscal benefits
offered under maquila legislation. At all events, the
main economic raison d’être is the abundance of
cheap labour that can perform labour-intensive opera-
tions.
The main competitive strategy of maquila plants
is product quality, however. Another element that
may give a plant a competitive edge is timeliness.
The challenge is to produce the highest quality in the
shortest period of time, using the relatively cheap labour
force that all the other plants also use. This competitive
strategy fits clearly within the description of “second-
generation maquila industry”. An illustration of the
quest for quality is that a substantial number of firms
interviewed had ISO 9000 certification, and almost
all were in the process of applying for it.
Finally, in the section about strategy a question
was included which was designed to explore the de-
gree of autonomy of the maquila plant (table 10). The
answers shed a clear light on what kind of learning
processes may be expected. With the exception of
some surprising answers, in general the managers at a
maquila plant do not have decision-taking power on
i) the procurement of raw material, ii) selection of the
end-products, and iii) marketing. If there is a depart-
ment of procurement at all, it is for the local acquisi-
tion of inputs that do not enter directly into the
production process. A maquila plant usually does not
have a sales department.
Managers at a maquila plant may have a say in
the selection of machinery and the financial and in-
vestment strategy. They are usually completely re-
sponsible for the recruitment and training of personnel
and the organization of production. It should be noted
that in plants with local capital, managers tend to
have a broader range of responsibilities.
2. Human resources development
The characteristics of the human resources employed
are similar in virtually all the plants visited. Around
80% of all employees have at most secondary educa-
tion; virtually no employees do not have at least pri-
mary education. Especially in Mexico, the trend is to
hire people who have completed their secondary edu-
cation. Over 50% of the total employees are between
18 and 24 years of age, while a further third are under
35. In apparel plants, between 60% and 90% of all
employees are women.
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TABLE 10
Mexico and Central America: Participation in strategic decisions
(Percentages)
Mexico Central America
None Some All None Some All
Procurement of raw material 67 24 10 68 27 5
Selection of end-products 67 33 - 77 18 5
Selection of machinery 24 19 57 9 27 64
Organization of production - 24 76 5 9 86
Training and recruitment - 10 90 - 14 86
Sales and marketing 52 24 24 59 27 14
Investment and financing 29 43 29 9 18 73
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Although it may seem far removed from “contri-
butions to local technological capabilities”, the train-
ing young men and women receive at a maquila plant
is a very important matter. For a good many, often
with a rural background, it is their first contact with
the formal, urban and industrialized world. They re-
ceive  formal  training  regarding the firm and their
specific job, but also in social habits, hygiene, and so
forth. Virtually all firms have continuously pro-
grammed courses on quality control, efficiency and
cost reduction, and prevention of accidents.
The job-related training received by workers is
modest in the sense that they are required to perform
only simple tasks, for which a few days of on-the-job
training suffice. The learning curve is short, espe-
cially in maquila industries outside the apparel sector.
A worker may reach normal productivity levels
within a week. In some apparel plants, however, the
learning curve may be longer.
Formal training is also provided for supervisors
and managers. Two important trends became clear
during the interviews: the proportion of employees
with advanced technical and academic education is
increasing, and they are increasingly locals. The
greater complexity of production processes accounts
for the first trend, while cost-awareness accounts for
the second. Local engineers and skilled technical per-
sonnel receive courses on training techniques, quality
control, teamwork and human resources manage-
ment. They are in frequent contact with foreign engi-
neers who visit the plant and provide technical
assistance, supervision and training. Moreover, local
engineers frequently have to visit corporate head-
quarters and plants in other countries in order to learn
in situ about production techniques. This type of in-
teraction seems to be more frequent in fully owned
subsidiaries of foreign firms than in maquila plants
with  national  capital. Administrative  personnel re-
ceive training on strategic planning, leadership, cus-
tomer satisfaction, fiscal and labour regulations, and
other self-improvement courses such as “the seven
habits of highly efficient people”.
Finally, a comment may be made regarding the
contribution of maquila industries to the formation of
entrepreneurs: perhaps the one human resource most
lacking in  underdeveloped countries. Local capital
participates significantly in maquila industries. Con-
sequently, a group of national entrepreneurs exists that
have both plants for domestic sales and assembly plants
for export. The relation with a foreign client allows
them to stay informed of product and process innova-
tions and to receive technical assistance. The knowl-
edge thus acquired can be transferred to their plants
producing for the domestic market, thus generating im-
portant productivity gains. The automation of production
processes and the introduction of modern organizational
techniques are frequently mentioned among the benefits
received in this way.
Nevertheless, maquila does not seem to be a very
suitable source for upgrading entrepreneurial skills.
Only exceptionally have local managers and technical
personnel of maquila plants been able to start their own
firms. The problem seems to be the absence of a suffi-
ciently aggressive and innovative group of local entre-
preneurs and the lack of financial and technological
support. Furthermore, the strict requisites of transna-
tional corporations regarding their suppliers represent a
barrier to entry into the industry.
The results of the questionnaire study show that
the contribution of maquila to technological learning
lies in particular in the realm of the organization of
production (table 11). Most of those interviewed con-
firm the use in their plants of modern organizational
techniques, such as flexible production, total quality
control, just-in-time production, and continuous im-
provement. Without doubt, the degree of utilization of
these techniques is more widespread in maquila plants
than in other national firms. Furthermore, these tech-
niques are not just plain copies, because most manag-
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TABLE 11
Mexico and Central America: Methods and
programmes for the organization of production
applied in the maquila firms interviewed
(Percentage of affirmative answers)
CentralMexico America
Total quality control 90 64
Just-in-time production 65 68
Continuos improvement 80 55
Team work 75 77
Manuals, procedures and internal rules 90 82
Workers’ suggestions programmes 50 77
Sharing of technical and economic
information with workers 65 72
Programmes to increase security
on the job 85 91
Ergonomic programmes 55 64
Source: Prepared by the authors.
ers confirmed the need to adapt organizational tech-
niques to local conditions and to the idiosyncrasies of
the workforce.
In all the countries studied, maquila plants are
under pressure to deliver large volumes of the best
quality products on time, while keeping production
costs in check. This pressure generates a continuous
search for the most efficient way of organizing pro-
duction. New  management and organizational  sys-
tems are introduced all the time, and almost all
maquila plants use production teams, quality control
programmes, operating manuals and norms, and
workers’ suggestions programmes.
3. Technological evolution of production
processes in maquila plants
The contribution of maquila industry to the knowl-
edge about production processes is also important.
Second-generation maquila plants use state-of-the-art
technology, to be able to meet the quality standards
of clients. Technical and supervisory personnel re-
ceive constant training in the use of the machinery,
and stay on   top of technological development.
Maquila plants make virtually no contribution to the
introduction and development of new products, how-
ever: product development remains an activity of cor-
porate headquarters.
At the plants visited in all six countries, an inter-
esting process has been observed in terms of the evo-
lution of the tasks performed. In many cases, an
assembly plant starts off with only a limited number
of simple assembly operations. When the plant meets
the standards of the client, other and more sophisti-
cated parts of the production process are transferred
to the plant, and sometimes even the whole produc-
tion process. After a number of years, the maquila plant
may even give feed-back to the corporate headquarters
and suggest changes in production processes. In some
cases, it has been found that the whole process of test-
ing and adapting a new production line is carried out at
the maquila plant. There seem to be two types of rea-
sons for this trend. First, there are those relating to
learning processes within the plant: as the quality and
efficiency of the labour force increases, the clients in
the United States increase their confidence in the ca-
pabilities of the maquila plant and entrust it with a
broader range of tasks. Second, there are reasons out-
side the sphere of the plant: there are competitive
advantages in having complete manufacturing proc-
esses (and even product and process design) concen-
trated in one location. The need to respond with agil-
ity to changes in demand, and the positive effects that
arise from the interaction between product and design
departments, generate a trend towards geographical
concentration of tasks.
In the case of maquila plants in Central America
and the Dominican Republic (especially in apparel
assembly) this evolution takes the form of a higher
degree of integration of production processes and
the introduction of more sophisticated machinery. A
dual movement can be observed toward “full package
production”10 and automation. Technicians and engi-
neers who were interviewed underlined the impor-
tance of being in contact with the complete
production process for ensuring a better learning
process (Vicens, Martínez and Mortimore, 1998).
In Mexico, four plants were observed to have
product design departments, with foreign and local
engineers. These departments contribute through the
design of small parts of the final product (usually not
the more technologically demanding parts). In two
plants –one producing television sets and another
electric organs– the design of the external structure is
done locally. In a third plant, producing air condition-
ing systems, tubes and connectors are designed lo-
cally. Only in a furniture factory is the full design
done at the maquila plant.
While these four cases are obviously excep-
tional, all the plants visited had quality control de-
partments with  some technological capabilities. In
the apparel sector, product design is carried out closer
to the place of final sale, in order to be in direct
contact with customers, and the foreign corporation
sends patterns and exact product specifications to the
maquila plant. Nevertheless, in all countries several
cases were found of plants that work with prototypes
and perform testing. What happens is that product
specifications and operating manuals are received
from abroad and tested at the plant, and feed-back
reports with recommendations on product specifica-
tions and inputs are prepared for discussion with the
foreign corporation.
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10 In “full package production” the maquila firm orders the
fabric and trimmings, and cuts, sews, finishes and packages the
product, while the client concentrates on marketing and distribu-
tion. In other arrangements, maquila plants only cut, sew, finish
and package the product, with the client providing the fabric and
accessories.
In Mexico, activities were observed which in-
volved incremental improvements in product specifica-
tions and design. More than 50% of the plants visited
reported that they had contributed, albeit sometimes
only in minor details,  to the product characteristics
through, for example, suggestions for the use of differ-
ent raw materials, recommendations that led to reduc-
tions in the use of inputs, modifications that allow easier
assembly and better functioning of the final product,
and changes in product presentation. In all these incre-
mental improvements, the final decision is not made by
Mexican or foreign engineers at the plant, since the
suggestions must be submitted to the research and de-
velopment centres at corporate headquarters, where the
final decision is taken.
Generally speaking, at the maquila plant no research
and development activities are carried out concerning ma-
chinery. The machinery is usually selected by the foreign
corporation, and the installation of production lines is car-
ried out, or at least supervised, by foreign engineers.
However, local engineers can and do learn from partici-
pating in the installation of production lines, and in some
cases subsequent production lines are installed by local
engineers, without technical assistance from the head-
quarters corporation.
In most cases, local personnel do perform some
maintenance operations, but if a major problem arises,
especially with the more sophisticated machines, spe-
cialists must come from abroad or parts of machines
must be sent to the supplier. If any “innovations” are
made to machinery by the maquila plant, they involve
peripheral components that speed up the production
process. Also, small ergonomic improvements have
been introduced by local engineers to adjust the ma-
chinery to the size and proportions of Mexican and
Central American workers, and some auxiliary tools
have been designed and fabricated.
4. Diffusion of technological learning outside
the maquila plant.
As noted earlier, the weak linkages between the
maquila plant and local firms mean that there are no
direct processes of transfer of technological capabili-
ties and know-how. If there is some diffusion of the
learning processes, it is through the training of the
work force, which may improve human resources ca-
pabilities in general.
Along the northern border of Mexico, in Costa
Rica, and to some extent in the Dominican Republic
and Honduras, formal relationships exist between
maquila plants and their trade associations, and training
institutes and schools. The idea is to improve the
preparation of the work force before workers enter
maquila plants. In the North Mexican case, the CON-
ALEPs, CECATIs, CETIS, State Universities and the dif-
ferent campuses of the Technological and Higher
Studies Institute of Monterrey (ITESM) are clear ex-
amples of educational institutes that maintain a
strong relation with the maquila industry and define
their curricula partly in the light of the needs of those
plants. In particular, in Ciudad Juárez there is an ac-
tive “liaison committee” in which representatives of
educational centres and maquila plants discuss the
training needs of the future work force. In Costa Rica,
most of the plants visited recognized the importance of
their relationship with the Costa Rican Technological
Institute and the Vocational Training Institute. The in-
stallation of a plant the size of INTEL in Costa Rica,
with its policy of hiring only people who have a tech-
nical degree on top of their secondary education,
speak English and are skilled in the use of the Mi-
crosoft Office computer programme has naturally
shaken the whole educational system. The company
has explicit ideas on educational policy in Costa
Rica, and works closely with national authorities to
improve the quality of the entire system. Most schools
and training institutes have introduced changes in their
programmes in order to supply human resources for
the incipient microelectronics maquila industry.
A special comment is in order regarding locally
owned maquila plants. Local firms that engage in as-
sembly operations for foreign clients usually do not
devote all their production capacity to these assembly
operations, and they maintain production lines cater-
ing to domestic demand. Consequently, there may be
a transfer of knowledge between the maquila plant
and the other production activities of the local firm.
The effective transfer of technology through this
channel depends on the type of relation with the for-
eign client, the characteristics of the products assem-
bled, and the similarity between the maquila
assembly line and the other production lines.
According to several managers who were inter-
viewed, the technological and productive capabilities
of local firms have improved because of the assembly
operations and the interaction with foreign specialists
of transnational corporations. New products, new
production techniques and new forms of organization
of the firm and of the production process have been
introduced in this way.
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Conclusions
The central question in this paper is whether maquila
industries contribute at all to local technological devel-
opment. The answer has to be affirmative. Maquila in-
dustries employ production techniques close to
international best practices: something that can only be
said of a small number of local manufacturing plants.
Additionally, maquila plants contribute to the formation
of human resources and introduce modern concepts of
organization and management.
This being said, it remains true that maquila ac-
tivities  are above  all  intensive in the use of  low-
skilled labour, of which there is an abundant supply
in the Caribbean Basin countries and Mexico. It does
not therefore seem appropriate to suggest that maquila
could be the type of international insertion that would
allow those countries to reach a sustainable growth
path with social equity. Its high import content and
low local value added limit its multiplier effect on
demand, so that its contribution to growth is lower
than could be expected from the volume of the activ-
ity. If maquila industries in their present form were to
multiply and completely dominate the production and
export structure, these countries would be specializ-
ing in the supply of low-wage labour, and their
growth would depend solely on the cost-competitive-
ness of this production factor. This does not seem to
be  compatible with  a long-run  strategy  of growth
with social equity. In the short run, of course, given
the abundant supply of low-skilled labour, maquila
industries do contribute positively to social equity,
given their impressive capacity to generate employ-
ment, especially for the presently unemployed or un-
deremployed poor.
In its present form, the maquila industry does not
seem to be an engine of sustainable development
with social equity, although its contribution is with-
out doubt a positive one. The road to follow seems to
be the transformation of maquila industry into an ac-
tivity that does not only base its competitiveness on
low wages and privileged market access conditions,
but also on increasing productivity and a higher
value-added content. At the same time, maquila in-
dustry  could mean a transfer of technology  to the
economy as a whole, although the diffusion of
knowledge acquired through maquila to other sectors
of the economy is still limited, because of the strong
dualism between maquila and domestic production,
and also because of the limited absorption capacity of
the domestic economies.
Furthermore, there are a number of external ob-
stacles that hinder a stronger contribution of maquila
industry to sustainable development with social eq-
uity. In the first place, transnational corporations still
maintain the policy of transferring “ready-made”
technologies, without  transferring  technological  re-
search and development activities. In the second
place, transnational corporations do not stimulate
procurement of local inputs, either because the corpo-
ration is vertically integrated, or because they have an
established network of suppliers that it is difficult for
local firms to enter, because of the certification proc-
ess for suppliers that requires time, money and tech-
nological capabilities those firms lack.
The change from apparel maquila activities to
the so-called “high-technology” maquila industry
that is underway in Costa Rica does not seem to be a
sufficient means for maquila to become a mayor
source of technological progress. The questionnaire
study clearly showed  the limitations of  microelec-
tronics maquila in this regard. Firstly, manual assem-
bly tasks predominate, as well as manual control of
machinery and visual quality inspection. Second,
technology is transferred “ready to use”, without
local research and development. Third, no microelec-
tronics firms exist in the local economy that could
absorb personnel who acquire increased knowledge
through maquila. Fourth, the lack of local content
limits the diffusion of knowledge. Finally, the rapid
pace of technological development in microelectron-
ics tends to nullify the possibilities of local manag-
ers   becoming agents   of “endogenization” of the
tecnology.
If the above is a fair picture of what maquila
industries contribute to technological progress in the
selected countries, three questions remain to be an-
swered. First, if maquila industries will evolve from
an activity highly intensive in the use of low-skilled
and low-paid labour to other activities more intensive
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in the use of productive knowledge and capabilities;
second, if technological progress in maquila indus-
tries spreads throughout the domestic economy; and
third, how public policies may help to obtain affirm-
ative answers to the first two questions.
With regard to the evolution of maquila indus-
tries,  the contrast between national cases provides
certain answers. The maquila industry has existed in
Mexico for over 30 years, and its production struc-
ture differs notably from maquila in Central America
and the Dominican Republic. In Mexico, most plants
are in high-technology sectors such as autoparts,
electrical appliances and microelectronic goods.
While it is true that only the labour-intensive parts
of the production processes are performed in Mexico,
it is nevertheless true that these firms hire increas-
ingly qualified personnel. Only rarely do they employ
workers with just primary education, and the pro-
portion of local technicians and engineers is increas-
ing. A similar pattern is observed in Costa Rica with
the entry of important plants in the microelectronics
sector.
The pressure maquila activities exert on the local
labour market is increasing real wages. This, in turn,
requires the maquila industry to evolve toward activi-
ties of a higher value-added content that will allow
higher wages. However, this evolution will not be
possible without effective support from the national
systems of human resource formation and institutions
that further technological development.
In sum, the evolution of maquila industries to-
ward activities that require higher qualifications of
the work force is possible, as shown by the Mexican
case, and it will be unavoidable when pressures on
the labour market push real wages upward, as shown
by the Costa Rican case. But it will not occur automat-
ically, and even less so in countries that do not have
supporting institutions for such development.
With respect to the second question, the spread
of technical change throughout the domestic economy
is limited because of three circumstances. First, because
the technical progress in maquila industries is itself of a
limited nature; second, because the linkages between
maquila and the domestic economy are weak; and third,
because the absorption capacity of the domestic econo-
mies is limited.
With regard to the issue of human resource for-
mation, the main question concerns the usefulness of
the knowledge thus acquired in other firms and other
functions, which would be an indicator of the possi-
bility that the abilities could be used in other eco-
nomic activities. Here a distinction may be drawn
between apparel maquila activities and other types of
maquila. In the apparel sector, the abilities acquired
by the workforce are widely used in domestic activi-
ties and also in local apparel firms. There is some
evidence that people who have learned production
techniques in maquila plants start small tailoring
workshops for the domestic market. In other maquila
activities, however, the type of know-how acquired
seems to be so specific that its utility outside the
maquila  plant is very limited. In general, maquila
firms tend to prefer to hire people without previous
experience because of their greater willingness to
learn specific job-related skills required by the plant.
In contrast, the knowledge acquired by local
technicians and engineers is more likely to be useful
to other firms, even if they are not in the maquila
business. The demand for those human resources is
so strong that frequently technicians and supervisors
are attracted away from maquila firms by offering
them higher salaries and better fringe benefits.
Some knowledge regarding production processes
may be transferred to other economic activities, even
outside the maquila industries, especially in the ap-
parel sector. The diffusion of  knowledge does not
seem to be of such a magnitude as to affect the level
of productivity of manufacturing industry as a whole,
however. The reason for this may be that, except in
the case of the apparel industries, the other sectors in
which maquila industries operate are not represented
in the domestic economy. Another factor may be that
the level of quality requirements in domestic indus-
tries is lower than in maquila activities. Finally, do-
mestic firms may have less financial possibilities for
acquiring state-of-the-art machinery and do not have
the same access to technical assistance.
A second factor that limits the spread of techni-
cal change in the domestic economy is the low level
of linkages between maquila industries and local
firms and institutions. Because of the nature of as-
sembly operations and the legal framework in which
they developed, maquila industries import virtually
all raw materials and inputs used in the production
process and therefore do not develop local suppliers.
Because the plants export almost all that they pro-
duce, there is also no direct competition with local
plants on the domestic market: something that would
oblige local firms to catch up with the technological
standards of the maquila industries. Some linkages
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exist with  local  human resource formation institu-
tions, but virtually no relations exist with institutions
engaged in technological research and development.
The third aspect –the low absorption capacity of
domestic firms for the technological progress gener-
ated in maquila industries– requires an analysis
which is outside the scope of the present paper. It
may be noted that there is a difference between
Mexico and Costa Rica, on the one hand, and the
Central American countries and the Dominican Re-
public on the other. The level of development of hu-
man resources and of the local institutions supporting
technological progress is significantly higher in the
first two countries.
This leads to the answer to the third question,
regarding policies to promote   the evolution of
maquila plants toward activities that are more knowl-
edge-intensive, as well as to promote the linkages
between maquila plants and local suppliers. Our main
finding is that maquila industry needs to be seen as
an integral part of strategies for the upgrading of pro-
ductive development. In the past, maquila was exclu-
sively considered to be part of employment policies.
Later it was also seen as a foreign-exchange earner.
Until now, it has not been regarded as a strategy for
the development of local productive capabilities.
This  may perhaps explain the existing  duality
between the productive specialization in maquila in-
dustries and in the rest of the economy. The element
of promotion of productive linkages was simply not
considered relevant at the time the promotion
schemes were devised. But the maquila industry
nowadays is a phenomenon of such a magnitude that
it undoubtedly forms part of the production structure
of the selected countries.
To consider maquila as an integral part of a strat-
egy of production development does not mean in-
creasing government interference to a level that
would hinder the growth of the industry. Clearly, in
the Mexican border zone local governments and
maquila organizations interact for mutual benefit. In
any case, production development strategies in Latin
America do not discriminate nowadays beforehand
between production sectors. They concentrate instead
on the improvement of human resources, strengthen-
ing of institutions to support technological develop-
ment, investment in infrastructure, and financial
support programmes. In these policy areas, the inter-
ests of maquila industries should be taken into ac-
count in the same way that those of other production
sectors already are at present. Only by strengthening
local productive and technological capabilities in a
general sense can maquila industries be made to
evolve successfully towards activities of a higher lo-
cal value-added content, with stronger linkages be-
tween the maquila sector and the domestic economy
and enhanced capacity of the domestic economy to
absorb the know-how generated.
One particular aspect deserves special attention,
and that is the tax regime for maquila industries and
local firms. The essence of maquila programmes and
export-processing free zones was exemption from
import taxes. Today, domestic exporting firms may
also receive those benefits, through drawback schemes.
In this respect, they operate under roughly the same
conditions. However, local efforts to attract foreign di-
rect investment have also included the granting of tax
holidays regarding other corporate taxes, notably profit
tax (in Central America) and asset tax (in Mexico). At
present, the trend is to allow maquila industries to
sell on the local market too, after paying import
taxes, which are increasingly negligible. When they
do this, however, maquila industries still retain the
privilege of not paying other corporate taxes, and this
difference in tax regimes encourages domestic firms
to set up shop in free zones or otherwise apply for
maquila status. If maquila firms are to be considered
equal to other manufacturing industries, these differ-
ences in tax regimes should be eliminated.
(Original: English)
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